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Assessment of face specificity in prosopagnosia is hampered by difficulty in gauging pre-morbid expertise for non-face object
categories, for which humans vary widely in interest and experience. In this study, we examined the correlation between visual
and verbal semantic knowledge for cars to determine if visual recognition accuracy could be predicted from verbal semantic
scores. We had 33 healthy subjects and six prosopagnosic patients first rated their own knowledge of cars. They were then
given a test of verbal semantic knowledge that presented them with the names of car models, to which they were to match the
manufacturer. Lastly, they were given a test of visual recognition, presenting them with images of cars to which they were to
provide information at three levels of specificity: model, manufacturer and decade of make. In controls, while self-ratings were
only moderately correlated with either visual recognition or verbal semantic knowledge, verbal semantic knowledge was highly
correlated with visual recognition, particularly for more specific levels of information. Item concordance showed that less-expert
subjects were more likely to provide the most specific information (model name) for the image when they could also match the
manufacturer to its name. Prosopagnosic subjects showed reduced visual recognition of cars after adjusting for verbal semantic
scores. We conclude that visual recognition is highly correlated with verbal semantic knowledge, that formal measures of verbal
semantic knowledge are a more accurate gauge of expertise than self-ratings, and that verbal semantic knowledge can be used
to adjust tests of visual recognition for pre-morbid expertise in prosopagnosia.
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Introduction
One of the continuing debates in the field of face recognition is
whether the defect in prosopagnosia is truly selective for faces,
or if faces are only the most obvious and dramatic stimulus
type affected by a problem in making fine discriminations
between highly similar exemplars within any object category
(Damasio et al., 1990; Farah et al., 1998). This debate is also
mirrored in the contrasting views of the fusiform face area as
a face-specific cortical module or a region involved in making
expertise judgements for many object categories (Gauthier et al.,
2000a, b; Kanwisher, 2000; Yovel and Kanwisher, 2004).
While there are cases of prosopagnosic patients who have also
lost the ability to recognize types of other objects such as cars,
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flowers, animals, clothing or buildings (Bornstein et al., 1969;
Newcombe, 1979; Assal et al., 1984; Gomori and Hawryluk,
1984; Damasio et al., 1986; de Renzi, 1986, 1991; Henke
et al., 1998), there are also reports of other prosopagnosic
patients who have retained the ability to discriminate between
such objects (Cole and Perez-Cruet, 1964; de Renzi, 1986;
McNeil and Warrington, 1993; Henke et al., 1998; Riddoch
et al., 2008). While variations in lesion anatomy can always be
invoked to account for such discrepancies, a critical methodolog-
ical issue also confounds attempts to address object specificity:
how well should any given subject be able to identify other
types of objects? Because recognition performance varies with
perceptual expertise, it may be difficult to deduce from a certain
level of performance whether the processing of other object cate-
gories is intact in a particular individual. For example, correct
naming of a car as a Volkswagen may be sufficient evidence of
intact car recognition in a novice observer, but insufficient in an
automobile enthusiast, from whom a more detailed answer might
be expected. This problem of accounting for pre-morbid expertise
reflects the fact that, while it is reasonable to assume that most
humans have a relatively uniform and significant expertise with
face recognition, the same cannot be said for most other objects,
for which we vary in our interest and experience.
To provide more definitive evidence regarding recognition in
other object domains besides faces in prosopagnosia, it would
be helpful to have a method of adjusting perceptual scores for
pre-morbid expertise. One possibility we considered was whether
one could index visual recognition for some object category by
some measure of the subject’s non-visual semantic knowledge
about that category. This novel strategy, however, requires a
strong correlation between visual semantic knowledge about
objects—which would be involved in visual object recognition—
and semantic knowledge about them in a non-visual modality.
We first review the grounds for believing that such a correlation
exists.
Semantic knowledge or memory, also known as conceptual
knowledge, is a ‘general knowledge of objects, word meanings,
facts and people, without connection to any particular time or
place’ (Patterson et al., 2007). There are many varieties of seman-
tic knowledge. In neuropsychology, distinctions have been made
between information categories (e.g. living versus non-living
things, actions versus objects) and modalities (e.g. visual semantic
knowledge versus verbal knowledge), based on the dissociations
between different forms of semantic knowledge in patients
(McCarthy and Warrington, 1994; Gainotti, 2006).
Neurological disorders are not the only source of inter-subject
variability in semantic knowledge. Semantic information is
acquired through experience with the world: thus ‘meaning is
updated or transformed by a dynamic memory system that
learns continuously from personal experience’ (Funnell, 2001),
and others define semantic memory as ‘knowledge of the world
acquired during experience, which contributes to the formation
and long-term representation of concepts, categories, facts,
word meanings and so on’ (Moscovitch et al., 2005). ‘Multiple
trace theory’ holds that the creation of multiple traces from
specific episodes results in the extraction of common data and
the formation of semantic information (Moscovitch et al., 2005).
Thus in healthy subjects, semantic knowledge about a specific
category will reflect the degree and frequency of past experiences
with that category: this is the basis of expertise effects.
Some propose that category and modality are orthogonal
variables in semantic knowledge (McCarthy and Warrington,
1994). Nevertheless, it is likely that for most humans the acquisi-
tion of semantic information about a particular category is
frequently multimodal, either within or across the episodes from
which semantic memory is created, and that, as a result, expertise
in one modality is usually paralleled by expertise in another. (This
may not always be the case: one can envision anomalous excep-
tions, such as that of a painter of birds who develops detailed
visual semantic knowledge about birds but little familiarity with
their habits, their calls or even their names.) If so, then it should
be possible to predict the degree of knowledge in one modalilty
from the degree measured in another, as we propose.
This assumption underlies recent examinations of subjects with
Alzheimer’s disease (Hodges et al., 1996; Lambon Ralph et al.,
1997) and semantic dementia (Lambon Ralph et al., 1999), which
tested these subjects for their ability to provide information in
response to either the names or the pictures of objects. When
asked to give verbal definitions to the spoken names of the
objects, Alzheimer’s patients had more difficulty with objects
whose pictures they also could not name. Furthermore, for the
objects that they could not name by sight, their semantic difficulty
was greater for structural (i.e. perceptual) properties than for other
types of information, such as the function of the object (Hodges
et al., 1996). In a clearer contrast, in patients with semantic
dementia the ability to provide core definitions for pictures of
objects paralleled their ability to provide similar definitions for
names of objects (Lambon Ralph et al., 1999).
While these data have been used to support an amodal concept
of semantic knowledge (Patterson et al., 2007), it is not clear
whether the intuitive assumption that semantic knowledge
correlates across different modalities holds in healthy subjects. In
a small group of 10 control subjects, the ability to provide correct
semantic information did not differ between objects they could or
could not name by sight, although there may have been a differ-
ence in the ability to provide core definitions (Hodges et al.,
1996). However, the number of items not named by sight was
too small to permit definitive conclusions.
This review thus suggests that, while there are grounds to believe
that semantic knowledge may be correlated across different
modalities, further study is required to establish the relationship
between visual and verbal semantic knowledge before we can
confidently use this strategy to index visual object recognition in
prosopagnosia. We decided to examine knowledge about a specific
object category for which the normal population shows a wide
range of knowledge due to expertise effects: cars. This object
category has been frequently used in studies of perceptual
expertise in healthy humans (Gauthier et al., 2000a, b, 2003;
Rossion et al., 2007; Tanaka and Corneille, 2007) and prosopag-
nosic subjects (Gomori and Hawryluk, 1984; Damasio et al., 1986;
Sergent and Signoret, 1992; Henke et al., 1998; Rossion et al.,
2003; Duchaine and Nakayama, 2005). While almost all humans
in our culture have daily experience with cars, car knowledge is
highly variable, reflecting factors such as occupation and interest.
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Our first goal was to establish, in healthy subjects, whether car
knowledge accessed through the verbal domain (names of car
models) is related to car knowledge accessed through the visual
domain (pictures of car models). If so, this relationship could be
used to create a test that adjusts visual car recognition scores for
each individual’s level of expertise, as gauged by performance on
a test of verbal semantic car knowledge. Our second goal was to
use this test to determine, in a group of prosopagnosic subjects, if
the relationship between visual recognition and verbal semantic
knowledge differed from that of healthy subjects.
Methods
Subjects
Thirty-three healthy subjects participated (25 male, 8 female), with
mean age of 24.9 years (range 18–43), all with normal corrected
vision. The protocol was approved by the Institutional Review
Boards of the University of British Columbia and Vancouver Hospital.
All subjects gave informed consent in accordance with the principles
of the Declaration of Helsinki.
We tested six prosopagnosic subjects. As part of an ongoing
prosopagnosia study, all had structural and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) (Fox et al., 2008), a complete
neuro-ophthalmological examination including Goldmann perimetry,
as well as a battery of standardized neuropsychological tests
(Table 1). In addition, their prosopagnosia was characterized with a
Famous Faces Familiarity Test that measured d0 for discriminating
famous from anonymous faces (Barton et al., 2001) and a test of
imagery for famous faces, designed to probe the status of facial
memories (Barton and Cherkasova, 2003).
R-IOT1 is a 49 year-old left-handed male who, 12 years prior to
testing, had a right occipital cerebral haemorrhage from a ruptured
arteriovenous malformation. Since then he has had trouble recognizing
faces, relying on hairstyle, facial hair or voice. He has a left superior
quadrantanopia but normal acuity, and mild topographagnosia. He
performed normally on all elements of the Visual Object and Space
Perception Battery. Neuroimaging showed a right occipito-temporal
lesion with loss of the right fusiform and occipital face areas (Fig. 1).
R-IOT3 is a 70 year-old right-handed male who had two sequential
right occipital strokes 2 years prior to testing. Since then he has had
trouble recognizing faces. Of note, he is a retired car mechanic. He has
visual acuity of 20/25, normal colour vision and a macula-sparing left
homonymous hemianopia. Neuroimaging showed a right occipito-
temporal lesion with loss of the right fusiform face area.
R-IOT4 is a 57 year-old man who had a stroke 6 months prior to
testing. Within a few hours of onset, he was aware that he could
recognize his wife’s voice but not her face. He also noted trouble
recognizing his own house and began getting lost in familiar surround-
ings. He has visual acuity of 20/25, normal colour vision and a
Table 1 Neuropsychological testing
Test Max R-IOT1 R-IOT3 R-IOT4 B-AT1 R-AT1 R-AT2
Visuo-perceptual
Hooper Visual Organization 30 27 27 22 20 25 28
Benton Line Orientation 30 29 25 24 28 29 28
Boston Naming 15 15 14 15 – 15 15
Imagery
Mental rotation 10 10 9 10 10 10 9
Attention
Star cancellation 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Visual search 60 54 32a 59 59 59
Memory
Digit span—forward 16 12 7a 8 12 10 13
Spatial span—forward 16 9 6 10 10 8 9
Word list 48 28 31 37 27a 37 35
Words, WRMT 50 41 47 50 45 41 47
Faces—Identity
Benton Face Recognition Test 54 45 49 46 45 41 47
Cambridge Face Perception Test 0 62 92a 76a 48 58 40
Faces—Expression
Affect discrimination, FAB 20 19 15 15 17 20 19
Affect naming, FAB 20 17 14a 17 18 20 18
Affect selection, FAB 20 19 17 18 20 19 20
Affect matching, FAB 20 18 16 15 17 20 20
Faces—Memory
Faces, WRMT 50 33a 33a 39a 27a 17a 27a
Cambridge Face Memory Test 72 – 38a 27a 39a 19a 30a
Famous face recognition (d0) 3.92 1.96 0.29a 1.28a 1.52a,b 1.22a 0.65a
Face imagery (%) 100 82 85 84 NA 71a 73a
a abnormal scores.
b Due to poor knowledge of celebrities, a version of this test using personally familiar faces.
FAB = Florida Affect Battery, WRMT = Warrington Recognition Memory Test.
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macula-sparing left superior quadrantanopia. Neuroimaging
showed a right occipito-temporal stroke with loss of the right fusiform
face area.
R-AT1 is a 24 year-old right-handed female who, 1 year prior to
testing, had a right amygdalohippocampectomy for epilepsy. Since
then she has had difficulty recognizing faces, relying on voice or
other cues to recognize people. General mental functioning is intact
and she is attending university, although she reports problems with
visual memory. She has normal visual fields and acuity of 20/15. She
scored perfectly on the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery.
Neuroimaging showed the surgical lesion in the right anterior temporal
lobe with preservation in both hemispheres of the fusiform and
occipital face areas and the superior temporal sulci.
R-AT2 is a 30 year-old left-handed female who had herpes simplex
encephalitis 5 years prior to testing, leaving her with right anterior
temporal damage. Since recovery, she has had trouble recognizing
faces, relying on body habitus, gait and voice cues instead. She has
trouble recognizing buildings in her environment. She has mild
problems with her memory but continues to function well in her
work at a bank. She has visual acuity of 20/15 and normal peripheral
visual fields. She had mild difficulty with recall on the Rey–Osterreith
figure, but did well on tests of verbal, episodic and spatial memory, as
well as on all tests on the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery.
Neuroimaging showed a large right anterior temporal lesion with
preservation in both hemispheres of the fusiform and occipital face
areas and the superior temporal sulci.
B-AT1 is a 24 year-old right-handed male who, 3 years prior to
testing, suffered herpes simplex encephalitis. Since recovery, he has
had extreme difficulty in recognizing faces, particularly with learning
new faces, though he can recognize some family members. General
memory and mental functioning is unaffected, allowing him to attend
college and hold full-time employment. He has mild topographagnosia
and difficulty recalling the names of low-frequency items (although
semantic knowledge of these items is evident). He has normal periph-
eral visual fields with 20/20 visual acuity. He had some difficulties
with progressive silhouettes (17/20) and silhouettes (10/30) on the
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery. Neuroimaging showed
bilateral anterior temporal lesions with preservation in both hemi-
spheres of the fusiform and occipital face areas and the superior
temporal sulci.
All subjects performed self-ratings and the assessment of semantic
knowledge, which were performed on paper, before the perceptual
test, which was presented on a computer display screen.
Self-rating of car expertise
Subjects were first asked to rate their car expertise on Likert scales,
ranging from 0 (novice) to 10 (expert). A separate scale was used for
Figure 1 Representative axial T1-weighted structural magnetic resonance images of the six prosopagnosic subjects. R-IOT1 had a
haemorrhage from an arteriovenous malformation in the right posterior medial occipito-temporal cortex. R-IOT3 has a posterior
cerebral arterial infarction of the right posterior medial occipito-temporal cortex. R-IOT4 has a similar infarct to R-IOT3. R-AT1 has
a right amygdalohippocampectomy. R-AT2 had a right anterior temporal lesions from herpes encephalitis. B-AT1 has bilateral anterior
temporal lesions from herpes encephalitis.
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each of six decades (1950s–2000s), for three different regions of the
manufacturers (North American, Asian and European). These 18 scores
were averaged to give a mean self-rating of car knowledge.
Assessment of verbal semantic
knowledge of cars
We compiled a list of all commercial car models made between 1950
and 2005 in North America, Asia and Europe, excluding trucks and
sport-utility vehicles. There were 457 in total. These were divided into
three groups for testing purposes: models designated by a number in
the first position of the name-string (e.g. 450SL, 911; n= 63), by a
letter in the first position of the name-string (e.g. SVX, A6; n= 77) or
by an actual name (e.g. Corniche, Grand Am; n= 317). Subjects were
given these three lists in random order and asked to write the name of
the manufacturer in a blank space beside the printed name of each
model. To assist them they were given a list of the possible answers,
which comprised 63 manufacturers (20 North American, 16 Asian
and 27 European). They were encouraged to guess and told that
there would be no penalty for incorrect answers.
Ideally an assessment of knowledge should take into account the
likelihood and frequency of exposure. Many variables can influence
the probability of encounters with a certain car, including the
number made, the number imported into the subject’s country,
media advertising, etc. We arbitrarily chose to make an approximate
adjustment for exposure by weighting correct answers for the number
of years a model was made, using a multiplicative factor of 0.1 points
for each year it was available. Thus giving the correct answer that a
Del Sol was made by Honda earned the subject 0.6 points, because it
was available from 1993 to 1998 inclusive. The score for semantic
knowledge was the sum of these weighted correct scores.
Assessment of visual semantic
knowledge of cars
We obtained full-colour images of each of these 457 cars, in natural-
istic settings, from the internet. From the list we selected 150 models,
distributed approximately evenly over the six different decades and the
three different continents of manufacture, with examples of all car
configurations, such as sedans, sport cars and station wagons, and
from a variety of viewpoints. We used Adobe Photoshop CS2 9.0.2
(www.adobe.com) to eliminate any identifying lettering or badges
that explicitly denoted the model or manufacturer.
Images were initially randomized and then shown in the same order
to all subjects on a display controlled by a G5 Powermac computer, in
standard dim lighting, using Superlab Pro 2.0.4 (www.cedrus.com).
Subjects were allowed to look at each image as long as they
wished. Each image was numbered and subjects were asked to write
the model, manufacturer and the decade of manufacture of the car
shown. Short breaks were allowed.
Three separate scores were calculated, one for each of the three
answers requested (model, manufacturer and decade). These scores
were not weighted since each image is of a specific car made in a
specific year, and not necessarily representative of all permutations
of that model over the different years of manufacture.
Analysis
First, we determined the relationship between self-ratings and
verbal semantic knowledge scores. This was done in two
ways: we assessed the correlation across subjects between
their global self-rating and their global verbal semantic score,
using JMP IN 5.1 (www.jmpin.com). Also, to assess within-
subject correlations, we assessed for each subject the correla-
tion between the self-rating and the verbal semantic score for
each of the 18 categories (six decades three continents of
manufacture).
Second, we performed two sets of multivariate analyses using
JMP IN 5.1, one incorporating the self-ratings and each of the
three visual recognition scores (model, manufacturer and decade),
and the other incorporating the verbal semantic scores and the
same three visual recognition scores. Because a main goal of this
work was to create a test that could adjust visual recognition
scores using an index of verbal semantic knowledge, we estimated
multiplicative scaling factors for model, manufacturer and decade
perceptual scores that, when combined, would generate a combined
visual semantic index with the highest correlation (i) between self-
ratings and visual recognition measures and (ii) between
verbal semantic and visual recognition measures. To do this, we
fixed the weight for the manufacturer perceptual score at one
and created a 2D table of r-values for different weights for the
model perceptual score along one dimension versus weights for
the decade perceptual score along the other dimension. From this
table, we could select the weight values that generated the highest
r-value.
Third, given the reports of item-concordance between visual and
verbal knowledge in disease states (Hodges et al., 1996; Lambon
Ralph et al., 1997), we were also interested in the concordance
between visual recognition and verbal semantic scores for individual
test items. Were healthy subjects more likely to visually recognize the
cars for which they could provide correct information on the verbal
semantic test, and did this vary with the level of expertise of the
subject? We took, from the verbal semantic test, the 150 items
that had a corresponding car image in the visual recognition test
and noted for each item the answers given by the subjects on both
tests. We created three 22 tables for each subject, with columns
representing accuracy on the verbal semantic test and rows represent-
ing accuracy on the visual recognition test, one table each for man-
ufacturer, model and decade identification on the visual component.
These tables were summed for the 17 subjects with the lowest
semantic scores (15–75), whom we thus considered as less expert
with cars, and the 16 with the highest semantic scores (114–267),
whom we considered as more expert. For these two groups, we
calculated odds ratios (the odds of answering correctly on a visual
item if subject was correct on its corresponding verbal semantic
item, divided by the odds of answering the visual item correctly if
they were incorrect on the verbal item). We then tested whether the
odds ratios for the more-expert group differed from those for the
less-expert group with a test for the homogeneity of odds ratios
(Fleiss, 1981).
Finally, to compare the prosopagnosic data to those of the
healthy subjects, we used a covariance analysis of the two groups,
to determine if the two regression lines for prosopagnosics and con-
trols are significantly separated (http://department.obg.cuhk.edu.hk/
ResearchSupport/Compare_2_regressions.asp). If the regression lines
of visual versus verbal semantic knowledge differ between these two
groups, such that for a given degree of verbal semantic knowledge
the prosopagnosics have a lower score for visual recognition, this
would be evidence of difficulty with non-face object recognition,
even after adjustment for expertise.
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Results
The relationship between self-ratings
and verbal semantic knowledge
Global self-ratings were moderately but significantly correlated
with verbal semantic knowledge (r= 0.68, P50.0001, Table 2,
Fig. 2). To some degree, the moderate nature of the correlation
may have represented between-subject variability in the values
used in the Likert scales. To determine if there was better
within-subject correlation between self-ratings and verbal
semantic knowledge, we also correlated, for each subject, their
self-ratings and verbal semantic scores for each of the 18 cate-
gories: the mean r-value was 0.56 (SD 0.21, range 0.03–0.83).
Thus, self-ratings do correlate moderately with verbal semantic
knowledge, but the range of correlations across individuals is
large.
Across-subject correlations with visual
semantic knowledge
Pair-wise correlations from multivariate analysis showed that self-
ratings also correlated moderately with perceptual recognition of
model and manufacturer, but less so with decade of make
(Table 2, Fig. 3). A weighted perceptual score of 1*(manufacturer
score) + 1.6*(model score) + 0.16*(decade score) gave the
optimum correlation of 0.73 (P50.0001).
Verbal semantic scores were highly correlated with perception
recognition of model and manufacturer, but again less so with
decade of make (Table 2, Fig. 4). A weighted perceptual score
of 1*(manufacturer score) + 1.6*(model score) + 0.02*(decade
score) gave the optimum correlation of 0.95 (P50.0001).
Item concordance of verbal semantic
and visual semantic knowledge
For all tests, healthy subjects in both the more- and less-expert
groups were more likely to give the right answer on a visual
recognition test if they had also given the right answer on the
verbal semantic test: the confidence intervals for all odds ratios
did not include the value of 1 (Table 3). The odds ratios were least
for decade of make and greatest for model name; the test for
homogeneity of odds ratios showed a significant difference
across model, manufacturer and decade for both less-expert
(2homog = 58.6, P50.0001) and more-expert subjects alike
(2homog = 133.1, P50.0001). Thus, as the information demanded
in the visual recognition task became more specific, the depen-
dence of the probability of visual recognition on the accuracy of
verbal semantic knowledge also increased.
The test for homogeneity of odds ratios showed that the
more- and less-expert groups differed only in odds ratios for
visual recognition of the model (2homog = 7.83, P= 0.005), but
not for recognition of manufacturer or decade of make
(Table 3). Less-expert subjects rarely recognized the model of
car for which they had not been able to provide the correct
verbal semantic information, and thus were 41.3 times more
likely to name the model of a visually presented car if they had
been able to match the model name with its manufacturer,
compared with an odds ratio of 10.8 for more-expert subjects.
Figure 2 The relation between self-ratings of expertise and
verbal semantic scores. Data from healthy subjects are shown
as small black dots, with the line representing the linear
regression of the relationship, and data from prosopagnosic
patients are shown as large grey discs. The data point for
R-IOT3 (a retired car mechanic) is marked by a grey disc with a
dark ring, and that for two other more-expert subjects, R-IOT4
and R-AT2, are marked by grey discs with a dot and a white
cross, respectively.
Table 2 Multivariate analysis—pair-wise correlations
Manufacturer Decade Self-rating Verbal-semantic
Visual-semantic scores
Model 0.87 (50.0001) 0.62 (0.0001) 0.71 (50.0001) 0.92 (50.0001)
Manufacturer 0.39 (0.0235) 0.70 (50.0001) 0.92 (50.0001)
Decade 0.42 (0.0144) 0.50 (0.0033)
Self-rating 0.68 (50.0001)
Values are given as r (P).
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Prosopagnosic subjects
First, we examined how well prosopagnosic self-ratings compared
with their verbal semantic knowledge about cars (Fig. 2). The data
of the six prosopagnosic subjects were similar to that of the
healthy subjects: the covariance analysis showed that the adjusted
mean verbal semantic score was 110.5 for healthy subjects and
155.2 for prosopagnosic subjects, and that the mean difference of
44.7 (SD 29.3) was not significant [t (35) = 1.52, P= 0.13]. There
was also no significant difference between the slopes of the
regression in the two groups [t (35) = 0.86, P= 0.39]. This suggests
that the correlation of verbal semantic knowledge with self-
assessment expertise was not different in the prosopagnosic and
control groups; indirectly, this may suggest that their lesions had
not caused a significant loss of semantic knowledge.
Second, we examined whether their visual semantic knowledge
was appropriate for their degree of verbal semantic knowledge.
On visual inspection, for all parameters (model, manufacturer,
year and weighted score), all prosopagnosic subjects tended to
fall below the mean regression line for healthy subjects (Fig. 4).
However, this is less apparent in the data using self-ratings than
the objective measure of verbal semantic knowledge (Fig. 3).
In particular, for the overall weighted perceptual scores, three of
the prosopagnosic subjects have data points that fall on the
regression line for healthy subjects, including subject R-AT2,
whose self-rating significantly underestimated her car knowledge
(Fig. 2).
The covariance analysis showed significant differences between
healthy and prosopagnosic subjects for all measures of visual
recognition, as reflected in the adjusted scores. For model recog-
nition, the adjusted mean visual recognition score was 16.4 for
healthy subjects and 1.2 for prosopagnosic subjects, a significant
mean difference of 15.2 [SD = 3.6, t (35) = 4.19, P= 0.0002]. For
manufacturer recognition, the adjusted mean visual recognition
score was 42.8 for healthy subjects and 13.8 for prosopagnosic
subjects, also a significant mean difference of 29 [SD = 4.9,
t(35) = 5.93, P50.0001]. Even for recognition of decade of
make, the adjusted mean visual recognition score was 64.4 for
Figure 3 The relation between self-ratings of expertise and visual recognition scores. (A) Graph for naming the model, (B) graph for
naming the manufacturer, and (C) graph for naming the decade of make. The (D) graph is for the weighted perceptual score. Data
from healthy subjects are shown as small black dots, with lines representing the linear regressions; r-values are for the correlation for
healthy subjects. Data from prosopagnosic patients are shown as large grey discs. The data point for R-IOT3 (a retired car mechanic) is
marked by a grey disc with a dark ring, and that for two other more-expert prosopagnosic subjects, R-IOT4 and R-AT2, are marked by
grey discs with a dot and a white cross, respectively.
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healthy subjects and 37.7 for prosopagnosic subjects, a significant
mean difference of 26.7 [SD = 10.8, t (35) = 2.48, P= 0.018].
Finally, using the weighted perceptual score, the covariance
analysis showed an adjusted mean visual recognition score of
70.2 for healthy subjects and 16.5 for prosopagnosic subjects,
with a highly significant adjusted mean difference of 53.7
[SD = 8.9, t (35) = 6.02, P50.0001]. These data thus show that
after adjusting for verbal semantic knowledge, the prosopagnosic
group has significantly worse visual recognition of cars than
healthy subjects.
Discussion
These results show that verbal semantic knowledge about mem-
bers of a specific object category (cars) is highly correlated
with visual semantic knowledge about items in that category.
This finding is consistent with expectations that one type of
knowledge should be related to other types, given the acquisition
of expertise through repeated episodes and encounters that
involve different sensory modalities and multiple sources of
information. Our results show that this relationship is strong
enough (r= 0.95) to allow an accurate prediction of visual recog-
nition ability from measures of verbal semantic knowledge,
making this a potentially useful means of determining whether
visual recognition is appropriate for the level of expertise indicated
by verbal semantic knowledge.
Previous work has suggested that binary self-classification as
expert or novice is correlated with the ability to match pictures
of car models across different years (Gauthier et al., 2003).
Our more detailed self-rating scores also show some correlation
with perceptual performance, but this is more modest than the
correlations between verbal semantic and visual recognition scores.
This may be due to between-subject variation in the use of
Likert scales. However, we also found that self-ratings were
highly variable in their within-subject relationship to verbal
Figure 4 The relation between verbal semantic scores and visual recognition scores. (A) Graph for naming the model, (B) graph for
naming the manufacturer, and (C) graph for naming the decade of make. The (D) graph is for the weighted perceptual score. Data
from healthy subjects are shown as small black dots, with black lines representing the linear regressions; r-values are for the correlation
for healthy subjects. Data from prosopagnosic patients are shown as large grey discs. The data point for R-IOT3 (a retired car
mechanic) is marked by a grey disc with a dark ring, and that for two other more-expert prosopagnosic subjects, R-IOT4 and R-AT2,
are marked by grey discs with a dot and a white cross, respectively.
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semantic knowledge. This suggests that self-ratings are not as
accurate a gauge of a subject’s expertise as a formal assessment
of verbal semantic knowledge.
Just as each subjects’ visual semantic score was highly correlated
with their verbal semantic score, the item-concordance analysis
showed that subjects were more likely to provide correct informa-
tion for the image of an item they had correctly matched on the
verbal semantic test, and that the odds ratio for this increased as
the information required became more specific and detailed.
At the most detailed level (model name), an expertise effect
emerged. Less-expert subjects rarely recognized the image of a
car whose name they had not matched correctly to manufacturer,
whereas more-expert subjects showed less difference in visual
recognition rates between cars whose names they had matched
correctly and those whose names they had not. Thus, while
less-expert subjects had lower rates of visual recognition of
items overall, they showed greater linkage between verbal and
visual semantic knowledge at the level of individual items. We
speculate that this reflects the narrow and limited experience of
less-expert subjects, compared with more-expert subjects who
have had a larger and probably more variable bank of episodic
encounters from which to derive semantic memory. If these
episodes vary in the linkage between verbal and visual informa-
tion, this would lead to lower concordance between such data in
semantic memory.
It should be stated that a correlation between semantic knowl-
edge across modalities in healthy subjects neither proves nor
refutes amodal theories of semantic representation (Patterson
et al., 2007). The multi-modal nature of most normal human
experience would lead equally to cross-modality correlations in a
model that segregates unimodal semantic data in distinct modules.
Rather, this type of data can set the stage for examinations of
dissociations following damage to structures involved in semantic
processing, which can provide more definitive data to test these
theories.
Assessing object recognition in
prosopagnosia
Our investigation of the correlation between verbal and visual
semantic knowledge was motivated by the question of object
specificity in the study of prosopagnosia. Patients with prosopag-
nosia have lost the ability to recognize familiar faces, in the
absence of other significant perceptual or memory dysfunction
(Barton, 2003). General semantic knowledge is usually preserved
in prosopagnosia, because such deficits are normally grounds of
diagnostic exclusion, as they point to semantic dementia (Hodges
and Patterson, 2007) or, if confined to knowledge about people, a
‘people-specific amnesia’ (Ellis et al., 1989; Hanley et al., 1989)
rather than prosopagnosia (just as more general perceptual deficits
point to general visual object agnosia rather than prosopagnosia).
Thus, a non-visual assessment of expertise should provide a rea-
sonable index of pre-morbid expertise. This may be particularly
true of subjects whose lesions do not extend to the anterior tem-
poral lobe, which has been implicated in disorders of semantic
knowledge (Hodges and Patterson, 2007).
Adjusting assessments of non-facial visual object recognition for
pre-morbid expertise would be desirable but has not been
attempted quantitatively in prosopagnosic subjects thus far.
Some have chosen object categories that they proposed were
universal in experience, such as common household objects
(Buxbaum et al., 1999) or fruits and vegetables (Barton et al.,
2004). However, mere exposure may be insufficient to guarantee
perceptual expertise, since motivated interest also plays a role.
Table 3 Item concordance
Verbal–semantic knowledge Odds Odds ratio (CI) Statistical tests
Model perceptual data
Less-expert subjects
Incorrect 6/2285 41.32 (23.5–72.6) 2 assoc 355.95
Correct 26/265 2 homog 7.83
More-expert subjects P 0.005
Incorrect 70/1330 10.83 (8.55–13.7)
Correct 402/1070
Manufacturer perceptual data
Less-expert subjects
Incorrect 262/2285 3.58 (2.71–4.73) 2 assoc 295.57
Correct 84/265 2 homog 0.0073
More-expert subjects P NS
Incorrect 381/1330 3.64 (3.07–4.30)
Correct 635/1070
Decade perceptual data
Less-expert subjects
Incorrect 751/2285 1.50 (1.15–1.95) 2 assoc 53.44
Correct 112/265 2 homog 1.00
More-expert subjects P NS
Incorrect 599/1330 1.75 (1.48–2.06)
Correct 630/1070
CI = confidence interval; NS = not significant.
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Subjective evidence of such interest has been used to guide the
choice of object category in other reports. Thus a woman who
worked in a restaurant was unable to recognize fruits and
vegetables (de Renzi et al., 1991) and a racing fan could no
longer recognize horses (Newcombe, 1979). On the other hand,
a soldier could still recognize military insignia (Cole and Perez-
Cruet, 1964) and R.M., a collector of miniature cars, could provide
the manufacturer, model and year for a large number of cars
(Sergent and Signoret, 1992). The ability to recognize personally
familiar exemplars has also been used. Farmers were reported to
have lost the ability to recognize their own cows (Bornstein et al.,
1969, Assal et al., 1984) while W.J. was able to recognize the
individuals in his flock of sheep (McNeil and Warrington, 1993),
and Case 4 could recognize his own razor, wallet, neckties and
glasses (de Renzi, 1986).
While these latter reports illustrate the range of associations
possible between face perception and the recognition of other
objects, it is clearly difficult to standardize the findings from
such idiosyncratic testing material. Also, none have tried to
verify the degree of expertise acquired through the reported expe-
rience of their subjects. Our results concerning the relationship
between self-ratings and either verbal semantic knowledge or
visual recognition raise questions about assumptions based on
mere exposure or occupation. Is it reasonable to assume that
any racing fan can recognize horses, and if so what degree of
accuracy should we expect? In prosopagnosia, what level of
accuracy for non-face object recognition is required to establish
or deny a dissociation with impaired face processing? We can
illustrate these difficulties by considering the case of R.M., the
miniature car collector, who recognized 172 of 210 cars; whereas
none of six controls, ‘two of whom claimed to have a definite
interest in cars’ (p. 381), scored better than 128 (Sergent and
Signoret, 1992). How can we be certain that the ‘interest’ of
those two controls matched the expertise of R.M., who had up
to 5000 cars in his collection? Even if their self-avowed interest is
taken as a declaration of expertise, our data show the limits of
self-assessment to index expertise, given that visual recognition
correlates more poorly with self-ratings than with an objective
verbal semantic measure. Thus, although R.M.’s score of 172
was impressive, without an objective measure of expertise, we
cannot know if these two controls were appropriate matches for
R.M. If they were not, it remains an open question as to whether
controls with an objectively demonstrated proficiency similar to
R.M. would have scored even better than his 172.
Our data from healthy subjects show that it is possible to use
verbal semantic knowledge to estimate the visual recognition that
we should expect from a subject. We found that the visual
recognition accuracy of all six of our prosopagnosic subjects fell
below the regression line of performance in healthy subjects,
despite very different lesions. Thus, after adjustment for verbal
semantic knowledge, prosopagnosic subjects recognized, on aver-
age, the manufacturer of 29 fewer cars in the 150 item test than
did the healthy subjects. The data for R-IOT3, R-IOT4 and R-AT2
particularly underlined the utility and importance of adjusting for
pre-morbid expertise. R-IOT3, a retired car mechanic, had scores
for visual car recognition superior to those of many of our con-
trols, but actually inferior when compared with controls with
similar verbal semantic knowledge about cars. The same was
true for R-IOT4 and R-AT2, two subjects with a non-professional
interest in cars, and who had significantly under-estimated their
car knowledge on their self-ratings.
Further testing of more subjects is indicated, to determine if
there is a consistent deficit for visual recognition of cars in proso-
pagnosia, regardless of lesion size, location or functional subtype
(in this regard, we would be pleased to supply the test to anyone
who emails the corresponding author). If so, this may support
assertions that the prosopagnosic defect represents a more general
failure in the ability to discriminate subtle differences between
members of the same object category, sometimes referred to as
the individuation hypothesis (Moscovitch et al., 1997). Proficiency
at such discriminations may reflect an experience- and interest-
dependent expertise, which the expertise hypothesis argues is
the fundamental defect in prosopagnosia (Gauthier et al., 1999).
While our results show a consistent deficit in car recognition in our
sample of six prosopagnosic subjects, despite significant variation
in the location, laterality and size of their lesions, it still remains
possible that their difficulties with non-face object recognition
stem from damage to regions adjacent to face-processing
structures, and therefore are correlated but not intrinsic to the
face-processing deficit in prosopagnosia. It is therefore desirable
to examine more prosopagnosic subjects, particularly those with
relatively limited lesions, to determine if any prosopagnosic subject
has truly spared car recognition, or if all show the same deficit.
Our data show how use of verbal semantic knowledge to adjust
visual recognition scores for pre-morbid expertise can increase
confidence in the validity of the conclusions drawn from such
perceptual data.
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